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This paper summarizes new evidence from the National
Bureau of Economic Research “Shared Capitalism” Project on the
extent to which workers’ earnings depend on the performance of
their firm or work group in the US and advanced Europe and on
the impact of sharing arrangements on economic behavior. The
evidence shows that: 1) a large and growing proportion of workers
are covered by shared capitalism through worker profit-sharing,
bonuses, or worker ownership of shares; 2) outcomes for workers
and firms are higher under shared capitalism than under other
work and pay arrangements; and 3) that worker co-monitoring
helps overcome the free rider problem that arises when part of pay
depends on the productivity and effort of all workers. [JEL
Classification: J33]
The notion that capitalism works better when firms and
workers share in the pecuniary rewards from the success of their
firm and when they participate in decision-making has a long
tradition in economic and social thought, going back to Alfred
Marshall, John Bates Clark, James Meade among others. Many
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do better when they share the returns from success with workers.
Governments throughout the advanced world have been sufficiently
impressed with the potential of shared capitalism to give firms
financial incentives for promoting worker ownership of shares and
in some cases have required firms to pay part of wages in profit
shares. The 1991 Promotion of Employee Ownership and Profit
Sharing report by the EU (the “Pepper Report”) directed attention
to profit sharing and employee ownership and called on member
states to promote participation by employed persons in profits and
enterprise performance.
To  succeed in improving output, sharing arrangements must
overcome the incentive to free ride that arises whenever someone
gains only part of the reward from their activity. Why should an
individual give full effort in an N person firm if only 1/Nth of the
payoff from that effort rebounds to the individual? It makes ratio-
nal “prisoners’ dilemma” sense to put out minimum effort and gain
part of the rewards from the effort of others – the suckers in pris-
oners’ dilemma terminology. If firms and workers did nothing to
counteract the incentive to free ride, few if any firms would intro-
duce shared compensation modes of payment. Those that chose
sharing arrangements would presumably do no better than hierar-
chical enterprises that operated without any sharing arrangements.
The facts are otherwise. Section 1 of this paper documents
that the proportion of workers covered by shared capitalist pay
arrangements is large and growing in the US and European Union.
Section 2 shows that firms with sharing arrangements tend to do
better for workers as well as for the business than do firms without
these arrangements. This raises the question: how do shared
capitalist firms overcome the free rider problem? Section 3 shows
that one way they overcome free riding behavior is through worker
co-monitoring at work sites.
1. - Defining the Terrain
There are several ways in which firms share the rewards (and
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10risks) of business with workers in what we call shared capitalist
arrangements:
Profit-sharing rewards workers based on the profit of the com-
pany by paying workers cash through bonuses on a yearly or more
frequent basis or by placing the workers’ share of profits in a re-
tirement plan (called “deferred profit-sharing”). Sometimes profit
sharing is paid to workers in company stock, so what is received
as a profit share becomes employee ownership.
Gain sharing offers workers payments based on the perfor-
mance of their work units rather than of the whole enterprise.
These systems often measure performance in productivity or cost
saving rather than in terms of profits. This means that non-prof-
it enterprises, including government agencies, can do gain shar-
ing while they cannot readily engage in profit sharing.
Employee ownership offers employees ownership of part or all
of a firm through shares of listed firms or through comparable
legal arrangements of non-listed firms. Countries often give tax
privileges to employee ownership plans. In the US, the main ve-
hicle is the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) – which fed-
eral legislation established to allow companies to borrow money
to fund worker ownership and repay in installments from com-
pany revenues. Under this scheme workers gain an ownership
stake without investing their own money to buy the stock. ESOPs
are tax privileged so that firms have an incentive to establish them
even if ownership has no effect on productivity or other “real econ-
omy” outcomes.
Employee Stock Purchase Plans allow workers to buy stock
with deductions from their paychecks with a discount from the
market price. The United Kingdom tax code privileges this form
of employee ownership. In the US employees can purchase stock
through their company 401k plan, a retirement plan in which they
make pre-tax contributions from their pay. Sometimes corpora-
tions match employee contributions to 401k plans with company
stock.
Finally, stock options are a hybrid between profit sharing and
employee ownership. A stock option gives the worker the right to
buy the stock at a set price anytime during a specified period fol-
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of a rise in the share price without the downside risk of losing
part of their investment.
Table 1 shows the extent of shared capitalist arrangements in
the US in 2002 and 2006. The data for the Table comes from ques-
tions on the General Social Survey (GSS) – a national probabili-
ty sample survey conducted annually by the National Opinion Re-
search Center of the University of Chicago – that the NBER placed
on the survey. These questions have made the GSS the major
source of information on these forms of compensation. In 2002
GSS obtained data on 1,145 employees in for-profit companies
about the ways in which they were paid. In 2006 it obtained da-
ta for 1,081 employees in for-profit companies.
The line “any of the above” in the Table shows that nearly
half of workers in US firms had some form of shared capitalist
compensation in 2006. This was modestly larger than the share
in 2002. Profit sharing was the most common shared capitalist
mode of pay, followed by gain sharing, and then ownership of
company stock and stock options. GSS data (not given in the
Table) show that profit and gain-sharing bonuses were sizable. The
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TABLE 1
PERCENT OF EMPLOYEES COVERED BY SHARED 
CAPITALIST COMPENSATION SYSTEMS IN US, 2002 AND 2006
Profit sharing 2002  2006
In profit-sharing plan 33.5 38.4
Received profit share last year 23.8 30.2
Gain-sharing
In gain-sharing plan 23.2 26.8
Received gain-sharing bonus 
last year 17.1 21.3
Own company stock 21.2 17.5
Stock options
Hold stock options 13.1 9.3
Granted options last year na 5.3
Any of above 43.1 46.7
Source: tabulated by KRUSE D. - BLASI J.R. - FREEMAN R.B. from General Social
Surveys; www.nceo.org/gss_2006_files/sheet001.html.mean ratio of bonus to workers pay in 2006 was 10% while the
median ratio of bonus to pay was 5-6%. The GSS data also show
a high ratio of the value of ownership of company shares to salary:
a mean ratio of the value of ownership of company shares to
salaries of 57% and a median ratio of 25% (Kruse, Blasi, Free-
man, chapter 4, Table 1).
Turning to Europe, Graph 1 shows the proportion of business
units with 200 or more employees in advanced European coun-
tries that reported that they had “broad-based” profit sharing
schemes or had a “broad-based” employee ownership scheme in
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GRAPH 1
PREVALENCE OF SHARED CAPITALIST COMPENSATION AMONG
LARGE EU COMPANIES 1999-2000
Source: PENDLETON A. - POUTSMA E. - VAN OMMEREN J. - BREWSTER C., Employee
Share Ownership and Profit-Sharing in the European Union, European Foundation
for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2001.2001. The term broad-based means that the plans cover many
workers rather than being exclusive to top executives, though it
does not mean that the plan covers all workers. The proportion
of units with profit sharing generally exceeds the proportion with
ownership schemes. Additional data for the EU’s 2,500 largest
business groups from the European Federation of Employee Share
ownership (2008) shows that by 2007 80% of these huge firms
had some such schemes the result of a massive logistic curve type
growth that began in the 1980s. These firms employed about 32
million workers in 2007.
Italy ranks low in having shared capitalist modes of pay. In
Graph 1 Italy is lowest among the countries in the proportion
of large firms with profit sharing and is 3
rd lowest in the pro-
portion of large firms with share ownership. The European Fed-
eration data show that Italy’s largest groups come closer to the
European average in the proportion with shares schemes, though
they still fall below the continent average. Having ownership
schemes does not, however, reflect the extent of employment fi-
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TABLE 2
FIVE OF TOP 10 EU MAJORITY EMPLOYEE-OWNED FIRMS IN ITALY
Employees
1 Mondragon Corporación  all industries, distribution 
Cooperativa 78,455 financial services ES
2 John Lewis Partnership 64,000 department stores
and supermarkets UK
3 Consorzio Cooperative 
Construzioni 20,000 Domestic building IT
4 Coveco – Consorzio
Veneto Cooperativo 17,000 Building, civil engineering IT
5 Conscoop 12,500 Building, civil engineering IT
6 Manutencoop 12,000 Facility management IT
7 Unipart 10,000 Logistics UK
8 Arcadis 9,208 Ingénierie & services 
architecturaux NL
9 Mott MacDonald 9,000 management, engineering, 
development consultancy UK
10 Team Service 8,000 cleaning services IT
Source: MATHIEU M., European Federation of Employee Share Owership, 2006.nancial involvement. Table 2 shows that Italian cooperatives
place the country high in number of workers in majority em-
ployee owned firms.
The data in Graph 1 and Table 2 are not comparable with the
US data in Table 1. The US data are based on surveys of a rep-
resentative sample of workers not on a survey of large establish-
ments or business groups. To obtain EU figures comparable to the
US, I turn to the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS),
which asked workers the following questions about whether they
were paid through shared capitalist arrangements:
— “What does your remuneration include?”:
a) Payments based on the overall performance of the compa-
ny where you work (profit sharing schemes);
b) Payments based on the overall performance of a group; in-
come from shares in the company your work for?;
— “Thinking about the payments based on the overall per-
formance of the company, are the payments based on the overall
When Workers Share in Profits, etc. RICHARD B. FREEMAN
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GRAPH 2
LEVELS OF FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION IN THE EU 
IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR (%)
Source: Fourth European Working Conditions Survey, 2005.performance of the company calculated according to a predefined
formula?”;
— “Do you receive these payments on a regular basis?”.
The EWCS covers representative samples of workers, who re-
sponded with a relatively high response rate, rather than from
large enterprises, who had a smaller response rate that potential-
ly biased it toward high rates of coverage. By differentiating cov-
erage among workers, moreover the EWCS would invariably pro-
duce lower rates of shared compensation even within large en-
terprises that are likely to have schemes.
Graph 2 gives the European Foundation for the Improvement
of Living and Working Conditions’ (2007) tabulations of shared
capitalism in Europe from the 2005 Working Conditions Survey.
It shows markedly lower rates of participation in share ownership
and profit sharing for workers than those given in Graph 1 for
large establishments and the 80% rate reported for the 2,500
largest business units. Critically, it shows much lower coverage of
workers by shared capitalism in the EU than those given in Table
1 for the US. Comparisons of the 2005 ECWS with the earlier
2001 ECWS shows that, while shared capitalism is less common
in the European Union than in the US, in the 2000s it increased
more rapidly in the European Union than in the United States.
In both places, profit-sharing, employee ownership, and re-
lated sharing arrangements are sufficiently widespread to make
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TABLE 3
CHANGES IN VARIABLE PAY AND CHANGES IN PRODUCTIVITY
AND HOW HARD PEOPLE WORK: THE VIEWS OF BRITISH
MANAGERS
Change in Variable Pay Labour Productivity How  Hard  People  Work
Up a Lot Up a Lot
Raise a Lot 21% 55%
Raise a Little 10% 44%
No Change 8% 40%
Lower 8% 40%
Source: FREEMAN R.B. - CONYON M.J. (2004).this form of operating business more than a “niche” in the vari-
ous economies.
2. - Shared Capitalism Effects on Outcomes
There is substantial production function literature on the ef-
fects of profit sharing and employee ownership on the outcomes
of firms, as reviewed by Kruse and Weitzman, Blasi and Kruse,
and Kruse. The production function studies find that firms with
shared arrangements have better outcomes than otherwise com-
parable firms without shared capitalism, usually by modest
amounts on the order of 2% to 5%. But the studies also show con-
siderable variation among firms. In the US at least profit sharing
tends to have larger effects on output than employee ownership.
This presumably reflects the fact that some large firms introduce
ESOPs primarily for financial reasons and do not treat workers
as owners or partners in the operation of the business. It also pre-
sumably reflects the fact that workers do not gain the financial
payoff from an ESOP until they retire, which for most will be
many years in the future.
Table 3 presents evidence on the effect of shared capitalist
arrangements on outcomes according to managers in the United
Kingdom. It cross-tabulates management reports from the UK’s
Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) on changes in
“variable pay” (the survey’s measure of sharing) and changes in
labour productivity and management on how hard people work.
The strong positive link between the variables is consistent with
econometric calculations that control for diverse other factors be-
tween UK worksites and other data on the effect of shared capi-
talist arrangements on the performance of UK firms (Conyon and
Freeman, 2002).
The NBER shared capitalism project obtained data from over
40,000 workers at hundreds of work sites and asked them about
the extent of shared compensation and, separately, about their be-
havior and that of their fellow employees. These data differ from
the WERS data in that they rely on worker rather than manage-
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results from multivariate regressions of diverse outcome variables
on specified measures of shared capitalism and an extensive list of
covariates.
Panel A shows link between outcomes likely to benefit the firm
and shared capitalist compensation in terms of the sign of the es-
timated parameter on the shared capitalist variable, where a plus
sign reflects a statistically significant relation that benefits the firm.
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TABLE 4
ESTIMATED EFFECT OF SHARED CAPITALISM ON OUTCOMES
OF CONCERN TO FIRM AND WORKERS
A) Outcomes that Benefit the Firm
Profit Gain Ee. Stock
sharing sharing own. options
Turnover + + + +
Loyalty + + +
Willing to work harder + +
Frequency of suggestions + + +
Absenteeism - +
Taking action against shirking + + + +
Culture for innovation + + + +
+ favorable effect
- unfavorable effect
A) Outcomes that Benefit the Worker
Profit Gain Ee. Stock
sharing sharing own. options
Participation in decisions + + +
Co. treatment of employees + + +
Supervision
Training + + +
Pay and benefits + + + +
Job security + + + +
Job satisfaction + +
Source: Panel A: FREEMAN R.B. - BLASI J.R. - MACKIN C. - KRUSE D.,  Creating a
Bigger Pie? The Effects of Employee Ownership, Profit Sharing, and Stock Options
on Workplace Performance.
Panel B: KRUSE D. - FREEMAN R.B. - BLASI J.R.,  Do Workers Gain by Sharing?
Employee Outcomes Under Employee Ownership, Profit Sharing, and Broadbased
Stock Options.The positive signs on turnover, for instance, means that the various
forms of shared capitalism reduced turnover. With the sole excep-
tion of the impact of gain sharing on absenteeism all of the esti-
mated coefficients are positive, indicating that shared capitalism
benefits the firm in ways that should improve firm productivity and
profits. Erika Harden, Douglas Kruse, and Joseph Blasi (2007) show
that the shared capitalist variables are also positively related to in-
dicators of innovative activity.
Some critics of shared capitalism have argued that what is
good for the firm must be bad for workers. In their view shared
capitalist compensation is simply disguised speed-up of work. Pan-
el B of Table 4 summarizes the results of the NBER analysis on
the link between shared capitalist compensation and outcomes
likely to benefit the workers, again from multivariate analyses with
an extensive set of covariates. The plus signs indicate statistically
significant results favorable to workers. The only factor that is not
significantly improved for workers is the extent of supervision,
which is largely independent of shared capitalist forms of pay.
Finally, the NBER data set contains information on over 300
worksites that allows us to aggregate the data by worksite and then
to relate the average reported extent of shared capitalism at the
workplace to the average perception of co-worker effort and pro-
ductivity at the workplace. This creates a stronger and more ap-
propriate test of the link between shared capitalist pay and behav-
ior than analyses of the relation between variables for individuals.
At the individual level, a positive correlation between shared capi-
talism and outcomes could reflect differences between workers with-
in a workplace rather than differences among workplaces. In the
worst case, one worker could report lots of shared capitalist pay
and work effort while a co-worker could report little shared capi-
talism and little effort. The result would be a strong positive corre-
lation between shared capitalism and reported effort among indi-
viduals but no relation at the more appropriate establishment unit.
To  deal with this disaggregation problem, we aggregated in-
dividual worker reports on various outcome variables and shared
capitalist modes of pay into establishment level averages and ex-
amined the link between the establishment level variables. Graph
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shows the regression line linking them. The plot shows that the
greater the amount of shared capitalist compensation at a work-
site, the greater is the effort workers say co-workers give to the
firm, the more they say co-workers are interested in how the firm
is doing; and the more encouraging they say co-workers are to
other workers. Additional analyses in Blasi, Kruse, Freeman (chap-
ter 4) give similar results for other measures of outcomes likely
to affect productivity.
The studies of shared capitalism based on production func-
tions and on management or worker reports of outcomes would
be more convincing if they were based on an experimental de-
sign that eliminated the endogeneity of the choice of shared
mode of compensation and related practices, but no firm or
group of firms has altered its compensation practices in an ide-
al random way. While it is thus possible that observed relations
reflect the impact of some unobserved factor, the collage of ev-
idence of different types and across different countries is com-
pelling. At the minimum, we know that shared capitalism is as-
sociated with positive economic outcomes. If we interpret the
patterns as causal, the interesting issue is to find the mecha-
nisms by which shared capitalist firms manage to overcome the
incentives to free ride that could undermine the modus vivendi
of sharing arrangements.
3. - Worker Co-Monitoring to the Rescue?
The NBER project focused on the hypothesis that worker co-
monitoring was an important deterrent to free riding behavior and
that it contributed to the success of shared capitalist enterprises.
The hypothesis has two parts: 1) that workers are more likely to
take action to reduce “shirking” behavior by fellow workers when
they are paid through shared capitalist compensation than when
they are paid purely on individual performance; and 2) that in
turn worker co-monitoring or anti-shirking behavior improves
worker activity and outcomes at workplaces.
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GRAPH 3
RELATION BETWEEN SHARED CAPITALISM AND OUTCOMES AT THE
LEVEL OF THE WORKSITE
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Average shared capitalism index at worksiteThe first part of the hypothesis follows directly from ratio-
nal responses to incentives. Workers should have different atti-
tudes toward co-workers depending on the structure of the work-
place and form of compensation. In a tournament race for pro-
motion, any given worker has an incentive to encourage shirking
by fellow employees. If a co-worker slacks off, this increases the
chance that the non-shirking worker will win the promotion. In
a piece-rate pay system workers will often discourage peers from
going all out since management may then lower the rate per piece
and harm the entire group. Shared capitalist compensation sys-
tems lie at the other end of the spectrum. They give workers rea-
son to monitor the activity of fellow employees and to help them
get up to speed at the workplace. When worker A receives part
of her pay through profit-sharing or share ownership or stock op-
tions, worker B’s failure to do his job “takes money out of A’s
pocket”. Worker A and other workers would be better off if the
shirker did his part.
The notion that worker co-monitoring may help explain the
success of profit sharing and employee ownership is an old one,
but until the NBER project there was no major survey of workers
that asked about co-monitoring behavior, much less linked this be-
havior to the structure of work and form of compensation. To fill
this gap in our understanding, the NBER project asked workers
on the GSS and on the NBER survey of firms about the ease of
observing co-workers’ performance, and how they would respond
to seeing fellow workers shirk. The first goal of our survey was to
find out whether employees could observe fellow employees’ work
activity – which is a necessary precondition for acting against shirk-
ing. We asked: “In your job how easy is it for you to see whether
your co-workers are working well or poorly? On a scale of 0 to 10
please describe with 0 meaning not at all easy to see and 10 mean-
ing very easy to see”.
The top panel of Graph 4 displays the frequency distribution
of answers from the GSS. The distribution is concentrated at the
upper end. Forty-nine percent of workers gave the highest possi-
ble answer (10) about the ease of detecting how co-workers are
doing, and another 28% giving answers in the 7-9 categories. Look-
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ble variation in these responses among employees. Workers who
answered with 7 or more to the question reported disproportion-
ately that they worked in a team as opposed to working by them-
selves and that they relied on coworkers and supervisors for help
compared to workers who answered 3 or less on whether they
knew how co-workers performed (Freeman, Kruse, Blasi, chapter
2). In addition, 13% of those who answered 7 or higher reported
that they are managers compared to 7% of those who answered
3 or less. We asked the same question in the NBER survey. The
distribution of responses was less concentrated than the distribu-
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GRAPH 4
A: GSS PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS BY HOW
WELL THEY CAN SEE WHEATHER CO-WORKERS ARE WORKING
WELL OR POORTY














3456789 1 0 11 12
10.0



























B: GSS FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF SUMMATED
RATING OF RESPONSEStion in the GSS but even so 62% of respondents gave a response
of 7 or more to the observability question.
Given that most workers can observe the effort of co-work-
ers, what do they do if they catch someone shirking? We asked:
If you were to see a fellow employee not working as hard or
well as he or she should, how likely would you be to:
a) Talk directly to the employee;
b) Speak to your supervisor or manager;
c) Do nothing;
d) (contained on only some company surveys) Talk about it in
a work group or team.
The responses use a four-point scale: not at all likely, not very
likely, somewhat likely, and very likely. To summarize the re-
sponses to these questions, we formed a summated rating (Bart-
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GRAPH 5
THE RELATION BETWEEN ANTI-SHIRKING BEHAVIOR
AND WORK SITE EMPLOYEE EFFORT AND PERFORMANCE, 
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eholemew et al., 2002) index of anti-shirking behavior based on a
1 to 4 scale, where 1 measures the lowest intervention and 4 the
greatest intervention. To form the index, we simply added the val-
ues of responses across questions so that the anti-shirking index
ranged from 3 to 12 for the observations based on the A to C re-
sponses. In this metric a 12 means that the worker reported that
it was very likely they would talk to the shirking employee, very
likely that they would talk to the supervisor, and not at all likely
that they would do nothing. A 3 means that they said it was very
unlikely they would talk to the shirking employee, very unlikely
they would talk to the supervisor, and very likely they would do
nothing. The index varied from 4 to 16 for the sample that in-
cluded the D response as well.
The bottom panel of Graph 4 summarizes the responses from
the GSS. It shows great individual variation in anti-shirking be-
havior. If we organize the data into five bins, grouping the 3 and
4 responses, the 5 and 6 responses, and so on, the distribution is
roughly uniform. There is also wide variation in the anti-shirking
index in the NBER company survey data.
A critic might note that these questions are based on hypo-
thetical situations: “… if you were to see … how likely would you,”
and might wonder if the responses reflect actual behavior or not.
To  deal with this critique, in some company surveys we added a
question, “Have you ever seen one of your fellow employees not
working as hard or well as he or she should over an extended time
period?” Fifty nine percent of the respondents said yes. We then
asked what they in fact had done in response. Their answers cor-
related highly with the respondents’ reported likelihood of taking
this action. This comes as close to validating the potential worker
behavior as one can do with a survey (Freeman, Kruse, Blasi, 2009,
chapter 2).
From these data I conclude that most workers can tell when
fellow employees are/are not shirking and that workers vary
greatly in their likely and past response to co-worker shirking.
The natural question to ask next is “Do workers show more an-
ti-shirking behavior when they share in the profits of the en-
terprise?”
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ing behavior on a summated rating index of shared capitalism,
using several questions about shared compensation, and of spe-
cific forms of shared capitalism entered as independent variables
in a separate regression. All of the regressions include a host of
covariates, such as the ease of observing co-workers, the nature
of jobs, the extent of supervision, the size of the workplace (which
show less anti-shirking behavior in larger workplaces, consistent
with the 1/N free rider pressure). The summary of results in Table
5 indicates that the index of shared capitalist compensation is sig-
nificantly positively related to anti-shirking behavior in both the
national GSS survey and the company-based NBER survey (ex-
cept for the likelihood of talking in a work group in the GSS).
However, the particular measures that are significant differ some-
what between the data sets. In the GSS, the presence of profit
sharing and gain sharing are the most important determinants of
anti-shirking behavior while in the NBER data the intensity  of
profit sharing and gain sharing matters most. The NBER results
show a strong effect of the profit/gain sharing bonus size and of
stock option holding and owning company stock on anti-shirking
behavior.
Serendipity provided us with another test of the posited impact
of shared capitalism on anti-shirking behavior. In the midst of our
survey, one firm announced that they intended to introduce a new
profit-sharing plan. They agreed to our administering the survey be-
fore the firm introduced the new plan, and six months later. The in-
troduction of the profit-sharing plan led to a jump in the percent of
employees saying they are eligible for profit sharing from 59% at the
first survey to 88% at the second survey. Apart from this, only two
variables in the survey changed significantly between the surveys:
the percent that said they were very likely to talk to a shirking co-
worker increased from 42% to 55%; and the percent that said they
would do something about a shirker because poor performance
would hurt the bonus or stock value increased from 39% to 56%.
That only these variables changed between the surveys points to-
ward a positive effect of profit sharing in attempts to combat co-
worker shirking.
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What happened as a result of anti-shirking activity?
Thirty five percent of the workers said that the employee who
was not working well resented it. But larger proportions said that
other employees appreciated the action (45%) and that the su-
pervisor appreciated it (40%). Just over one-third said that the em-
ployees’ performance improved (36%) while nearly the same pro-
portion said that the employees’ performance did not improve.
This could be viewed as a moderately successful intervention, as-
suming that the shirking employees’ performance did not worsen,
which we unfortunately did not ask.
But anti-shirking activity could have a much broader impact on
workplace behavior than this analysis of the shirking worker would
imply. Knowing that co-workers are likely to do something if they see
signs of shirking should itself reduce shirking and the need for co-
monitoring interventions. There is a potential equilibrium where the
threat of anti-shirking activity reduces shirking to zero and reduces
observed anti-shirking behavior to zero as well. Our study does not
have hard performance data linking the anti-shirking behavior to
outcomes, but it shows that several measures of co-worker and fa-
cility performance are highly related to anti-shirking behavior.
Among individual workers, those who report a higher likelihood of
talking to a shirker, and a lower likelihood of doing nothing, rate
their co-workers’ effort higher, report that workers tend to encour-
age each other, and rate their facility at doing better on five measures
of performance. Calculating site level averages, we found that work-
sites with higher average scores on the anti-shirking index also had
significantly higher average evaluations of workplace performance.
This is illustrated in Table 5 for the employees’ evaluations of co-
workers performance. In additional analyses, we have found equal-
ly strong results with other measures as well (Freeman, Blasi, Kruse,
2009, chapter 2).
In sum, the evidence suggests that anti-shirking behavior by
workers has positive consequences for worker effort and workplace
performance.
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As the reader has probably noticed, there is a problem with
the story thus far. Shared capitalism may work in part because
worker co-monitoring reduces shirking behavior but why should
anyone monitor fellow employees? The costs of intervening with
the shirker fall on the intervener but that person gets only part
of the benefit of the monitoring activity (in an N worker group
the worker who intervenes gains 1/Nth of the benefit going to
workers and none of the benefit that goes to capital). The free rid-
er problem has not been defeated but rather moved to another
domain of behavior: from shirking vs working to monitoring and
intervening with shirkers vs remaining silent.
One possible reason why some workers intervene to help or
pressure co-workers to improve their performance is that this
may materially benefit them. Fellow workers may appreciate that
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TABLE 5
ESTIMATED EFFECT OF SHARED CAPITALISM ON ANTI-SHIRKING
BEHAVIOR IN TWO DATA SETS: GSS OUTCOMES OF CONCERN TO
FIRM AND WORKERS: SIGNIFICANT OF MEASURE OF SHARE
Measure of anti-shirking behavior GSS- NBER
or form of anti-shirking behavior National Survey Company Survey
Effect of index of shared 
capitalism on 
Anti-shirking Index + +
Any Profit-gain sharing +
Profit-gain sharing share of salary +
Any Stock options +
Stock options as share of salary
Employee ownership +
Ownership as share of pay
Mode of Anti-shirking behavior
Talking to shirker + +
Talking to supervisor + +
Talking in group meeeting +
Source: FREEMAN R.B. - KRUSE D. - BLASI J.R., Worker Responses to Shirking. worker A intervened with the shirker and look upon A as a leader
in the workplace. Management may rate the worker who inter-
vened more highly than other workers, and take this into account
in promotions. On the firms behalf, many managements seek to
develop a corporate culture in their firm that emphasizes com-
pany spirit, promotes group cooperation, encourages social en-
forcement mechanisms, and so forth (Weitzman and Kruse, 1990;
Blasi, Conte, and Kruse, 1996; Blasi, Kruse, and Bernstein, 2003,
pages 226-228).
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TABLE 6
REASONS WORKERS GAVE FOR TAKING ACTION OR DOING
NOTHING AGAINST SHIRKERS AT THEIR WORKPLACE
Signif
All Lower Upper Effect of 
(1) (2) (3)        SC
Why you might do something
I like helping others 44.9% 47.2% 42.8%
Employee might help me in the future 31.0% 32.0% 29.7%
Poor performance will cost me and 
other employees in bonus or stock 42.9% 32.0% 58.2% yes
Other employees appreciate 
it when someone steps forward 23.9% 19.9% 32.0% yes
Want to keep work standards high 46.6% 41.6% 58.9% yes
Employee’s poor performance 
could affect my own job 55.9% 53.2% 61.3% yes
number of workers  32,386
Why you might do nothing
Employee not working well would 
resent it 41.3% 37.9% 44.7% yes
Other employees would 
react poorly 23.4% 24.3% 21.8%
It’s the supervisor’s job, not mine 44.7% 45.0% 39.7%
Some other employee will probably 
take action 8.4% 10.5% 6.1%
There’s no financial benefit for me 7.7% 10.2% 4.9% yes
Nothing in it for me personally 11.0% 13.3% 8.0% yes
number of workers 30,363
Source: FREEMAN R.B. - KRUSE D. - BLASI J.R., Worker Responses to Shirking.One way to gain insight into the reasons workers engage in
anti-shirking behavior is to ask them. The NBER survey asked
why workers might or might not intervene with a shirking co-
worker. Table 6 presents responses to this question. Over half of
workers said they would be likely to do something because the
employees’ performance could affect their own jobs (56%). Al-
most half of workers said they would do something because they
want to keep work standards high (47%), which I interpret as
seeking to maintain a cooperative solution to reinforce high work
norms. Almost as many workers expressed their concern for own
financial well being, saying the poor performance would lead to
lower bonus or stock value (43%). Forty-five percent said they
simply like helping others and 31% said the employee might help
them in the future.
Critical to our analysis, the reasons workers gave for inter-
vening with shirkers are related to their participation in shared
capitalism. For example, the percent saying that poor performance
would lead to lower bonus or stock value is almost twice as high
among those with a high value on the shared capitalism index
(58%, in col. 3) than to those with a low value on the index (32%
in col. 2). Similarly, the former group is more likely to say they
would intervene with a shirker to keep the work standard high
(59% compared to 42%). Column 4 shows that the shared capi-
talism index is positively correlated with five of the reasons for
taking action.
Turning to reasons for not taking actions against shirkers, for-
thy-five percent of workers who said they would not take action
ascribed their behavior in part to the view that it was the super-
visor’s job. Forty-one percent expressed fear that the shirking em-
ployee would resent it. Twenty-three percent feared that other em-
ployees would react poorly. Eight percent said that some other
employee would probably take action. Again, these responses are
related to the mode of compensation. Shared capitalism is a strong
predictor of the fear that the shirking employee would resent the
action, perhaps because the intervener would be seen as acting
out of a financial concern rather than concern for the worker. The
shared capitalist index also predicts a lower likelihood that the
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for me personally”.
Evidence that people behave in ways that go beyond the
standard model of a rational optimizing agent is not, of course,
unique to anti-shirking behavior. In prisoner dilemma games,
participants almost always cooperate more than is rational, in
ultimatum games, participants appear to weigh “fairness” heavi-
ly in behavior, and individuals donate in to charity and volun-
teer their time, when homo oeconomicus would led Nigel do it.
Fehr and Gachter (2000) have found that individuals punish de-
fectors in laboratory experiments even when it is not in their in-
dividual self-interest to do so due to norms of reciprocity that
many hold strongly. Anthropologists report that voluntarily
“policing” cooperation occurs in many societies, which could
mean that it is hardwired through evolution. Some economists
have suggested how ostracism can be effective in promoting co-
operation (Hirshleifer and Rasmussen (2003). Fudenberg and
Maskin (1986) show how the free rider problem can be over-
come in an ongoing relationship by a cooperative agreement
among participants.
Whatever its underlying cause, anti-shirking behavior and oth-
er deviations from economic rationality have strong implications
for the viability and success of shared capitalism.
4. - Conclusions
The NBER study of firm and worker performance when firms
share profits with workers gives a reasonably favorable picture of
profit sharing, gain sharing, employee ownership, and other forms
of shared capitalism. Using new questions on the nationally rep-
resentative GSS and on the NBER survey of individual firms, we
have found that most workers believe that they can readily detect
shirking by fellow employees; that those paid by some form of
“shared capitalism” are more likely to act against shirking, and
that workers in workplaces where there is more anti-shirking be-
havior report that co-workers work harder, encourage other work-
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31ers more, and that their workplace facility is more effective in
ways related to productivity and profits. Those data sets and oth-
ers show that shared capitalist arrangements are large and grow-
ing in the US and EU. The concusion seems inescapable: shared
capitalism has become a substantive successful part of modern
capitalism.
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